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What Does the Fairness Doctrine
Controversy Really Mean?
by
JEROME

A.

BARRON*

Introduction
The short-run question in the controversy over the Fairness Doctrine' is whether Congress will someday restore the Doctrine. The next
question is, if Congress does restore the Doctrine, will President Bush
veto it? If President Bush does not veto it, the Fairness Doctrine still
faces other perils in order to survive. A constitutional challenge will
surely ensue.
The first part of this Commentary explores the irony that neither the
FCC nor the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has displayed any eagerness to face the ultimate constitutional
question: Does the Fairness Doctrine violate the first amendment? As
we shall see, the Court of Appeals managed to uphold the FCC abolition
order without holding the Fairness Doctrine unconstitutional in any fundamental sense, and without precluding Congress from resurrecting the
doctrine. The Court of Appeals provided a judicial benediction for the
demise of the Fairness Doctrine. In the long run, it leaves the door open
for revival of the Fairness Doctrine by Congress.2 But the Fairness Doctrine controversy has a meaning for the first amendment and the future
of broadcast regulation that transcends the immediate outcome of the
various battles to come: whether fairness will be restored to broadcasting.
This larger, transcendent meaning of the Fairness Doctrine controversy is the focus of this Commentary. In 1987, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), emboldened by the unanticipated
developments chronicled below, abolished the Fairness Doctrine altogether. Abolition was based to a large extent on the theory that the refer*
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ence to the Fairness Doctrine in the 1959 amendment to section 315 of
the Federal Communications Act of 1934 did not codify the Doctrine.3
This amendment, it was successfully argued, acknowledged the public
interest standard that permeates the entire Federal Communications
Act.4
The second part of this Commentary contends that a bedrock fairness principle inheres in the public interest standard. It is my position,
3. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1989), states the following:
CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC OFFICE; FACILITIES; RULES
a. Equal opportunities requirement; censorship prohibition; allowance of station use;
news appearances exception; public interest; public issues discussion opportunities.
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for
any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to
all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed under this
subsection upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate.
Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any1. bona fide newscast,
2. bona fide news interview,
3. bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is incidental
to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary),
or
4. on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited to
political conventions and activities incidental thereto),
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the meaning of this
subsection. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news
documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford
reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public
importance.
b. Broadcast media rates
The charges made for use of any broadcasting station by any person who is a
legally qualified candidate for any public office in connection with his campaign for
nomination for election, or election to such office shall not exceed1. during the forty-five days preceding the date of a primary or primary runoff election and during the sixty days preceding the date of a general or special
election in which such person is a candidate, the lowest unit charge of the station for the same class and amount of time for the same period; and
2. at any other time, the charges made for comparable use of such station by
other users thereof.
c. Definitions
For purposes of this sectionI. the term "broadcasting station" includes a community antenna television
system; and
2. the terms "licensee" and "station licensee" when used with respect to a
community antenna television system mean the operator of such system.
d. Rules and regulations
The Commission shall prescribe appropriate rules and regulations to carry out
the provisions of this section.
4. See infra text accompanying note 98.
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and that of others who seek to restore the Fairness Doctrine, that the
public interest standard itself has a minimalist definition that includes
fairness. This core meaning of the public interest standard is built into
the Federal Communications Act and the structure of American
broadcasting.
The abolition of fairness is intended to privatize American broadcasting and to make the broadcast media fungible with the print media.
This can only really be accomplished if licensing is also abolished.5 If
licensing is not abolished-and it is a rare broadcaster who argues that it
should be-then broadcasters must remain public trustees operating in
the public interest. The public interest standard, which these trustees are
licensed to observe, contains a fairness component that cannot be thrown
off. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. Inc. v. FCC,6 Justice White set forth
the " 'public interest' in broadcasting" as an independent ground for "the
presentation of vigorous debate of controversial issues of public importance and concern to the public."'
In short, the Fairness Doctrine controversy is basically a challenge
to the responsibilities that the licensing process inevitably imposes and it
should be understood as such. The war on the Fairness Doctrine is really
a war against the idea of the broadcast licensee as a public trustee operating in the public interest. It is a battle to insist on licensing without taking responsibility for it. It is-when the first amendment smoke screen is
removed-a battle to get something for nothing.
For at least twenty years, since the 1969 Red Lion decision, the life
of the Fairness Doctrine has been precarious.' Red Lion, which validated the Doctrine on first amendment grounds, 9 is the source of enduring controversy despite its unanimity. Red Lion represents a positive role
for government in the opinion process; it suggests not only that such a
role is consistent with the first amendment, but that it requires imple5. Licensing means that broadcasters, before the commencement of the license period,
have received government permission to operate, and that broadcasters, after the expiration of
the license period, must ask a government agency for permission to continue. The newspaper
press does not have to ask for such permission either to begin or to continue. Barriers to entry
and to continuation are conditioned on the market. Since broadcast licensees are almost always renewed even against competing applicants, broadcasters depend on government to keep
out their competition. Since no government net of licensing envelops and shields the newspaper press, it is not surprising that more is asked of broadcasters in the way of public service
,obligation than of newspaper publishers. Thus, in Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1430 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the court, although generally
approving FCC deregulation of radio, nevertheless declared that there was a "bedrock obligation" on the part of broadcast licensees "to cover public issues."
6. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
7. Id. at 385.
8. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
9. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 396.
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mentation of the first amendment."0 Resistance to the constitutional
ideas expressed in that decision has since continued unabated.
A quick look at the language of the Doctrine may evoke surprise
that so much controversy has been occasioned by it. Chief Justice Burger summarized the Doctrine for the Court in Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. DemocraticNational Committee," "formulated under the
Commission's power to issue regulations consistent with the 'public interest,' the [Fairness] Doctrine imposes two affirmative responsibilities on
the broadcaster: coverage of issues of public importance must be adequate and must fairly reflect differing viewpoints."
The current debate over the Fairness Doctrine is the latest chapter
in a continuing struggle over the meaning of the first amendment in the
context of the broadcast media. The intensity of the current struggle is
reflected in the fact that FCC abolition of the Fairness Doctrine on August 4, 1987, brought to a head the battle between Congress and the
FCC. 12
Whether the Fairness Doctrine will be revived is unclear. Congress
has been trying to enact a new fairness statute since the FCC abolition
order. 3 If a new federal statute does revive the Fairness Doctrine, then
such a statute will undoubtedly be challenged in the courts as invalid
under the first amendment. If a new federal statute is not enacted, then
the nature of the argument will shift. It will be argued that fairness still
exists as a statutory obligation under the Federal Communications Act of
1934 by virtue of the public interest standard and the public trusteeship
concept.
Whether the new battle over fairness proceeds along statutory or
constitutional lines, it will raise fundamental issues about the nature of
broadcast regulation and about the meaning of the first amendment. This
Commentary will discuss the significance of some of these issues.
In the next stage of the struggle over the Fairness Doctrine, decisions of the FCC and the Court of Appeals, which together have managed to abolish the Fairness Doctrine, will have considerable importance.
These decisions and their implications for the first amendment climate
10. Id. at 394-96. "Believing that the specific application of the Fairness Doctrine in Red
Lion, and the promulgation of the regulations in RTNDA, are both authorized by Congress
and enhance rather than abridge the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First
Amendment, we hold them valid and constitutional .
Id. at 375.
11.412 U.S. 94, 110-11 (1973).
12. See Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, 5057 (1987), recon. denied, 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 2035 (1988).
13. S. 742, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1934, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S.
REP. No. 34, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987);H.R. REP. No. 108, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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with regard to broadcast regulation create issues that will have considerable importance in the future. These issues will be addressed first.
I
FCC Abolition of the Fairness Doctrine-Background
Section 315 played a key role in the Fairness Doctrine controversy.
This amendment exempted certain broadcasts from generating "equal
opportunities" obligations from the broadcast licensee. In the course of
setting down these exemptions in section 315(a), Congress included the
following disclaimer language:
Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving
broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news
interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news
events, from the obligation imposed on them under this chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the
discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance. 14
This disclaimer language has ever since been relied on by fairness
proponents to support the contention that Congress "codified" the Fairness Doctrine in section 315. Fairness adversaries contend with equal
force that the statutory language quoted above only acknowledges the
authority of the FCC to administratively establish a Fairness Doctrine
under the public interest standard.
Trouble for the Fairness Doctrine arrived with the political success
of the adversaries of government regulation-the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency and the appointment of Mark Fowler as FCC
Chairman in 1981. Trouble also came in the form of significant defections of former supporters of the Fairness Doctrine.' 5
14. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1989).
15. For example, an influential defection was that of Judge David Bazelon of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia who was once a stalwart defender of the
Fairness Doctrine. In two cases, Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16
(D.C. Cir. 1972) and National Citizens Comm'n for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) [hereinafter NCCB], aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 436 U.S. 775 (1978), Judge
Bazelon expressed grave doubts about the Doctrine. In his dissent in Brandywine-Main Line
Radio, Judge Bazelon expressed the view that the Fairness Doctrine might impact too adversely on the small, under-funded radio station. 473 F.2d at 64. In NCCB, he declared that
Watergate had changed his thinking about the Fairness Doctrine and that he now thought the
Fairness Doctrine might be too susceptible to political manipulation. 555 F.2d at 954. Interestingly, the Watergate tapes, which provoked these concerns, involved the licensing process
and not the Fairness Doctrine. The licensing process, of course, still endures.
See also F. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD GUYS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE SPEECH vs. FAIRNESS IN BROADCASTING (1975). Friendly's thoughtful concerns about broadcast regulation and the Fairness Doctrine, although fundamentally
supportive, were symptomatic of a decline in enthusiasm for the Fairness Doctrine. Id. at 3242. Friendly did not call for the abolition of the Doctrine. He asked instead that the Doctrine
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The first amendment climate changed after Red Lion. The success
of the print media in warding off a right of reply 6 gave new impetus to
those who always believed that broadcasting should be under the same
first amendment regime as the print media.
The seventies were a decade of considerable ambivalence about
whether, in a first amendment sense, the media or the public should hav e
the dominant stake in broadcasting.1 7 In the eighties, there was less willingness to see the first amendment as protecting competing speakersthe public and the broadcast journalist. A narrower, less catholic conception of first amendment rights was in the air. Policies which accorded
specific legal rights to the public were suddenly vulnerable."8 The Fairness Doctrine was particularly targeted for demolition by the ascendant
deregulatory philosophy.
A.

Paving the Way to Abolishing the Fairness Doctrine

The first real blow to the security of the Fairness Doctrine did not
come from the FCC but from a Supreme Court decision, FCC v. League
of Women Voters of California.19 The case did not directly concern the
Fairness Doctrine but in fact reaffirmed it. In League of Women Voters,
the Supreme Court held that a provision of the Public Broadcasting Act
of 1967,20 which forbade editorializing by noncommercial educational
broadcasters receiving funds from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, violated the first amendment.21
Although Justice Brennan, who wrote the opinion, said the Court
still adhered to the public trusteeship concept of broadcast regulation
based on the scarcity rationale,2 2 he noted that the rationale had increasbe narrowed. Like Henry Geller, he urged that fairness be considered only at renewal time.
Id. at 229.
16. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258-59 (1974). Tornillo had

rejected claims of public rights to the print media. This gave new impetus to the claim that
there should be no public rights to the electronic media either. See generally L. POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 248-56 (1987).
17. Compare, for example, Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973), where the broadcaster's first amendment rights were emphasized over a claim
of public first amendment access rights, with FCC v. National Citizens Comm, for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978), where the public's first amendment interest in diversity prevailed
over claims that the FCC's cross-ownership policies violated rights of newspaper owners and
broadcasters.
18. The political, editorial and personal attack rules came under scrutiny in 1983. See
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 48 Fed. Reg. 28295, 28298, 28301 (June 21, 1983). Fairness
came under scrutiny one year later. Inquiry Into the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of
Broadcast Licensees, 49 Fed. Reg. 20317 (1984).
19. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
20. 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-99 (1967).
21. 468 U.S. at 376-81.
22. Id. at 376.
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ingly come under attack.2 3 Justice Brennan stated the Court would
nonetheless not reconsider its longstanding approach to broadcast regulation without a signal from either the FCC or the Congress on whether
"technological advances" now required some "revision of the system of
broadcast regulation."12 4 In League of Women Voters, Justice Brennan
thus shook the ground under both the scarcity rationale and the Fairness
Doctrine. He noted that if the FCC could show that the consequence of
the Fairness Doctrine was to reduce rather than enhance speech, then the
Court would have to reconsider the constitutional basis of Red Lion.25
The 1985 FairnessReport26 was the FCC response to the Supreme
Court request for a "signal" in the League of Women Voters case.27 In a
separate statement, FCC Chairman Mark Fowler characterized the 1985
Fairness Report: "Today's Report is an indictment of a misguided government policy. It is a recital of its shortcomings, both legal and
28
practical.,
In the 1985 FairnessReport, the FCC posited that it could not repeal
the Fairness Doctrine because it was codified by the 1959 amendment to
section 315.29 The FCC also declared that it had no authority to make a
determination on the first amendment validity of the Fairness Doctrine.3 °
Thus, the 1985 Fairness Report did not abolish the Fairness Doctrine.
That was not its purpose. Its purpose was to shake the Doctrine to its
foundations by undertaking a major assault on the factual predicates
upon which the Doctrine rested. If these factual predicates were no
longer sound, then constitutional reconsideration of the Doctrine would,
hopefully, become necessary. Accordingly, the 1985 Fairness Report
made two findings that would be vital to any first amendment reconsideration of the Doctrine.3" First, fairness chilled expression.3 2 Second, the
23. Id. at 376 n.il.
24. Id. Justice Brennan also observed in this footnote that "[c]ritics, including the incumbent Chairman of the FCC, charge that with the advent of cable and satellite technology,
communities now have access to such a wide a variety of stations that the scarcity doctrine is
obsolete." See, e.g., Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60
TEx. L. REv. 207, 221-26 (1982).
25. 468 U.S. at 378-79 n.12.
26. In re General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d
143 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 FairnessReport].
27. 468 U.S. at 376 n.ll.
28. 1985 FairnessReport, 102 F.C.C.2d at 252.
29. Id. at 148.
30. Id. at 155.
31. Id. at 152-53.
32. In the 1985 FairnessReport, the FCC concluded that the Fairness Doctrine chills
speech. See id. at 147-48. The FCC said on the basis of this finding alone "we no longer
believe that the Fairness Doctrine, as a matter of policy furthers the public interest and we
have substantial doubts that the Fairness Doctrine comports with the strictures of the first
amendment." Id. A principal basis for the finding was the testimony of broadcast journalists,
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increase in the number of radio and television outlets in the years since
Red Lion removed the need for the Fairness Doctrine.3 3
The 1985 FairnessReport revealed the FCC's true feelings about the
Fairness Doctrine, but it did not itself occasion destruction of the Doctrine. The vehicle the FCC used to do so developed out of an enforcement proceeding, Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH. 34
The Syracuse Peace Council filed a complaint against the Meredith Corporation, licensor of television station WTVH in Syracuse, New York,
for violating the Fairness Doctrine. Surprisingly, the FCC enforced the
Fairness Doctrine initially. 35 The FCC agreed with the complainant,
Syracuse Peace Council, that the station failed to give viewers alternative
perspectives on whether a nuclear power plant was a desirable investment for New York.36
The Meredith Corporation petitioned the FCC for reconsideration
of the decision on the ground that the Fairness Doctrine violated the first
amendment. 37 The FCC denied Meredith's petition for reconsideration. 38 Nothing in the petition, according to the FCC, persuaded it to
change its finding that WTVH had violated the Fairness Doctrine.3 9 In
declining to declare the Doctrine unconstitutional, the FCC relied on its
refusal to rule on the first amendment issue in the 1985 FairnessReport.'
such as Dan Rather of CBS News, that "the very existence of the Fairness Doctrine creates a
climate of timidity and fear, unexperienced by print journalists, that is antithetical to journalistic freedom." Id. at 171. Citizen groups challenged these findings on the ground that this
testimony was self-serving and that it related to the opinion of journalists about the impact of

the Fairness Doctrine on programming practices rather than to specific incidents. Id. at 180.
The FCC rejected these objections on the ground that broadcast journalists were in the best
position to assess whether or not the Fairness Doctrine actually inhibited the presentation of
controversial issues of public importance. Id. at 181.
The FCC analysis of the chilling effect issue is exclusively focused on the impact of the
doctrine on the broadcaster. No inquiry is directed to the issue of whether the existence of the
Fairness Doctrine encourages members of the public to insist on the balanced presentation of
controversial issues. In short, chilling effect as a first amendment principle is approached as if
only the broadcaster may invoke it. The chilling effect on individual members of the public
from loss of the Fairness Doctrine is simply not considered by the FCC, despite the admonition in Red Lion that "it is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters which is paramount." Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
33. Judge Williams, in Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3427 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1990) (No. 89-312), said these were the two
"core" findings of the 1985 Fairness Report.
34. 99 F.C.C.2d 1389 (1984).
35. Id. at 1393-94.
36. Id. at 1401.
37. Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 59 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 179
(1985).
38. Id. at 185.
39. Nonetheless, the FCC said no remedy was called for because WTVH had granted
Syracuse Peace Council air time during the summer of 1984. Id. at 184-85.
40. Id. at 182 n.4.
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Again, the FCC said that the appropriate forum for such action was
either Congress or the courts.4 1
Meredith then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit.4 2 On the basis of the first part of
Judge Silberman's decision for the court of appeals in Meredith, one
might have thought that the court was eager to reach the constitutional
issue. Judge Silberman went out of his way to put aside standing and
non-constitutional grounds for disposing of the case.4 3 But it turned out
that the court of appeals did not want to rule on whether the Fairness
Doctrine was in violation of the first amendment; the court wanted the
FCC to do it.44
Both the FCC and the court of appeals that decided Meredith
wanted the Fairness Doctrine declared violative of the first amendment.
But neither wanted to take the initiative. Judge Silberman's decision in
Meredith remanded the case to the FCC so that it could consider Meredith's claim that the Fairness Doctrine is unconstitutional.4 5
Sending the first amendment "hot potato" back to the FCC was not
easy; there were serious legal hurdles to overcome. For one thing, Judge
Silberman had to escape from the long-established administrative law
doctrine that federal administrative agencies cannot declare federal legislation unconstitutional. 46 The theory of Meredith is that the FCC established the Fairness Doctrine as an administrative policy in the course of
41. Id.
42. Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
43. Id. at 869-70. Arguably, Meredith prevailed on reconsideration before the FCC. The
FCC ruled that Meredith acted in good faith in giving Syracuse Peace Council air time during
the summer of 1984. Id. at 868. There was, therefore, a substantial question whether Meredith had standing to challenge the FCC's original determination that Meredith violated the
Fairness Doctrine. What was being enforced against Meredith as a result of the FCC's denial
of Meredith's petition for reconsideration? No remedy was enforced against WTVH in the
case. Was there any injury? Nevertheless, the court of appeals found standing to exist: "The
FCC's holding is inherently coercive in the sense that it is binding on Meredith; it is an implication as to future conduct and could be used against the licensee in a renewal hearing." 809
F.2d at 869.
Similarly, Meredith contended that there was no "controversial" issue of public importance involved. Id. at 870-71. Meredith argued that when it aired the advertisement for the
plant in the summer of 1982 "the economic soundness of the Nine Mile II plant had ceased to
be controversial because the New York State Public Service Commission had already approved
the plant." Id. at 871. Had the court of appeals in Meredith decided the case on a noncontroversial issue basis this would also have made it unnecessary for the court of appeals to
rule on the first amendment question. Id. at 870. Nevertheless, the court of appeals decided it
would not dispute the FCC's finding that the nuclear plant issue was controversial. Id. at 871.
44. Id. at 872.
45. Id. at 874.
46. Judge Silberman conceded the problem, presented by the doctrine set forth in Johnson
v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974), "that regulatory agencies are not free to declare an act of
Congress unconstitutional." 809 F.2d at 872. But he said the Fairness Doctrine was an ad-
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its continuous interpretation of the public interest." Just as the FCC
could create the Fairness Doctrine under its power to interpret the public
interest standard, so too could it abolish the Doctrine on that power.
Yet, as Judge Silberman saw it, the FCC was afraid simply to say
this and to abolish the Doctrine. Why? If the FCC abolished fairness on
the ground that it was just an administrative doctrine, when Congress
believed fairness was a statutory obligation, the FCC would have to
reckon with the anger of Congress.4"
Judge Silberman's opinion tried to make it difficult for the FCC to
avoid resolving the first amendment issue. In his view, the FCC could
not avoid passing on the constitutional issue just because it would irritate
Congress to do so.4 9 The FCC's only alternative to ruling on the first
ministrative and not a statutory creation and, therefore, the doctrine of Johnson v. Robison did
not apply. Id.
47. The authority Judge Silberman relied on for this conclusion was the decision of another District of Columbia Circuit panel, Telecommunications Research and Action Center v.
FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986) [hereinafter TRAC I], petition for reh'g en banc denied,
Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
[hereinafter TRACII]. TRACI held, in Judge Silberman's words, "that the Fairness Doctrine
is not mandated by statute." 809 F.2d at 873 n. 11 (emphasis in original).
48. In Judge Silberman's view, the FCC had already indicated that it believed that the
Fairness Doctrine was not statutorily created or mandated in its 1985 Fairness Report. Id. at
872. This conclusion flowed from doubt expressed by the FCC about the Fairness Doctrine's
constitutionality in the 1985 FairnessReport: "[o]f course, the fair inference to be drawn from
the Commission's report was that the Commission believed the doctrine was not specifically
mandated; otherwise, it would have been irresponsible for the Commission gratuitously to cast
constitutional doubt on a Congressional command." Id.
49. Id. at 872-73. For the FCC to rule on the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine
would mean that the FCC believed fairness to be an administrative creation rather than a
statutory obligation. But the FCC could not refuse to rule on the first amendment validity of
fairness simply because that would have implied that fairness was not statutorily compelled
and Congress would be displeased. Id. The FCC could not refuse to rule on the first amendment issue just because it would be "politically awkward." Id. at 874. But, as Judge Silberman pointed out, the FCC worked hard to popularize its view that the Fairness Doctrine was
not codified. Judge Silberman stated in Meredith that the FCC had "largely undermined the
legitimacy of its own rule." Id. at 873. This was, if anything, an understatement.
What is remarkable is that the FCC strategy to undermine the Fairness Doctrine was
used in Meredith to create an exception to the doctrine that an agency cannot challenge the
constitutionality of its own statute. See id. at 874 n.13. Judge Silberman describes the FCC
campaign to undermine the Fairness Doctrine's legitimacy as follows:
The FCC has issued a formal report that eviscerates the rationale for its existing
regulations. The agency has deliberately cast grave legal doubts on the fairness doctrine and has done so in such a formal fashion that it contends-in our companion
case, R TNDA-its Report creates jurisdiction for this court to review the legality of
the doctrine itself.
Id. at 873.
The RTNDA case to which Judge Silberman refers is Radio-Television News Directors
Ass'n v. FCC, 809 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated, 831 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In
RTNDA, a court of appeals panel was asked to rule that "in light of the Commission's finding
[in the 1985 FairnessReport] that the Fairness Doctrine has a chilling effect on the first amend-
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amendment issue in an enforcement proceeding was to find that the Fairness Doctrine violated the public interest standard.
Judge Silberman characterized the Meredith case as an enforcement
case.5 0 But what was being enforced? In its denial of this petition for
reconsideration, the court did not impose any form of redress on the
Meredith Corporation. Judge Silberman detected only one possible adverse effect on the broadcaster: that the initial determination that Meredith had violated the Fairness Doctrine might be a demerit against it
when Meredith applied for a license renewal. 51 Because the FCC's hostility to the Fairness Doctrine was, if anything, greater than Meredith's,
it certainly strains credulity to believe that the FCC would not renew
Meredith's license on such a basis. This is particularly so when the FCC
went out of its way to praise Meredith's good faith for giving air time to
the Syracuse Peace Council in the summer of 1984.52
In essence, the whole scenario was reminiscent of an Agatha Christie murder mystery-the Fairness Doctrine taking the place of the
corpse. Many parties had a reason for wanting the victim out of the way,
but no one wanted to do the awful deed.
B. The FCC Abolishes the Fairness Doctrine
In the aftermath of Meredith, the FCC was at last presented with
the scenario it wanted. The Meredith court remanded the case to the
FCC to consider Meredith's constitutional arguments.5 3 Prior to the
FCC's decision, the federal court of appeals in TRAC I held that the
Fairness Doctrine was not statutory law but merely an administrative
creation. 54 Therefore, the Fairness Doctrine could be repealed by the
FCC. Congressional action was not necessary. Mark Fowler's dream of
burying the Fairness Doctrine had become at this juncture almost a judiment activities of broadcasters, it is important that the court now consider the constitutionality

of the Fairness Doctrine." 809 F.2d at 862. The court quickly ducked this opportunity to pass
on the first amendment validity of the Fairness Doctrine and ruled in the three-page opinion
that the 1985 Fairness Report did not constitute "agency action" subject to judicial review. Id.
Interestingly enough, in the RTNDA case, the FCC agreed with the broadcasters seeking
review that the 1985 FairnessReport was "an appropriate vehicle" for reviewing the Fairness
Doctrine. Id. Why did the FCC take this position in R TNDA? Because then the court would
have borne the onus of declaring the Fairness Doctrine unconstitutional rather than the FCC.
Why did the court not do this in R TNDA? One reason might be that an intermediate appellate
court would then have been the first to rule on the first amendment invalidity of the Fairness
Doctrine, contra Red Lion and Congress. Political awkwardness appears to be in the eyes of
the beholder.
50. 809 F.2d 863, 872-73 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
51. Id. at 869.
52. Id. at 868.
53. Id. at 874.
54. See TRACI, 801 F.2d 501.
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cial directive. No one, of course, was in suspense as to the FCC's conclusion. Judge Silberman was not in suspense either, having observed in
Meredith that the 1985 FairnessReport "would appear to foreshadow its
conclusion as to the constitutionality of the enforcement proceeding
against Meredith.""
On August 4, 1987, the FCC abolished the Fairness Doctrine as
predicted; it concluded in Syracuse Peace Council that "the Fairness
Doctrine contravenes the first amendment and thereby disserves the public interest." 6 The FCC based its conclusion on the following grounds: s"
(1) the Fairness Doctrine chills speech; (2) the Fairness Doctrine is not
narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial governmental interest; (3) dramatic changes in the electronic marketplace provide a basis for Supreme
Court reconsideration of the diminished protection provided to the electronic media;58 and (4) because societal roles of print and electronic media are identical, the same first amendment principles should be applied
to each.5 9 These issues are still the key to determining the first amendment validity of the Fairness Doctrine.
When the FCC declared the Fairness Doctrine invalid in Syracuse
Peace Council, numerous parties quickly sought review in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Many public interest groups urged reversal.' The networks and Meredith intervened in the proceeding to urge affirmance, as did the FCC. In Meredith,
the FCC expanded the proceeding, inviting comments on whether, in
light of the 1985 Fairness Report, the Fairness Doctrine was constitutional and whether its enforcement was in the public interest. 6 As a
result, there was widespread participation in the proceeding by friends
and foes of the Fairness Doctrine. Meredith brought together communications law luminaries who supported opposing views on the Fairness
Doctrine issue.62
55. 809 F.2d at 872.
56. 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, 5057 (1987).
57. Id. at 5048-58.
58. The FCC in Syracuse Peace Council relied heavily on FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), concluding: "We further believe, as the Supreme Court indicated in
FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, that the dramatic transformation in the telecommunications marketplace provides a basis for the Court to reconsider its application of
diminished first amendment protection to the electronic media." 2 F.C.C. Rcd. at 5058.
59. Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 657.
60. These included the Democratic National Committee, Common Cause, National
Council of Churches, and United Church of Christ.
61. 809 F.2d at 872.
62. Floyd Abrams, Henry Geller, Andrew Schwartzman, and Timothy Dyk, among
others, participated in the debate.
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On petition for review on February 10, 1989, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals upheld "the FCC's decision that the Fairness Doctrine no longer served the public interest was neither arbitrary,
capricious nor an abuse of discretion."6 3 The court affirmed the FCC
decision without reaching the constitutional issues in Syracuse Peace
Council and denied the petition for review." The Fairness Doctrine,
which had been advocated earlier by such illustrious members of the District of Columbia Circuit as Judges Bazelon, Burger, Wright, and Tamm,
was no longer favored in the very circuit which had long sustained it.
The affirmance by the court of appeals in Syracuse Peace Council of
the FCC decision abolishing the Fairness Doctrine was surprising for
what it did not say. The court panel was no more anxious to resolve the
question of the first amendment validity of the Fairness Doctrine than
Judge Silberman had been in Meredith. The opinion for the panel was
written by Judge Stephen Williams. Judge Kenneth Starr wrote a concurring opinion, and Judge Patricia Wald concurred in part and dissented in part.65
Judge Williams began his opinion conventionally, stating that the
Fairness Doctrine had neither constitutional nor statutory status.6 6 He
made it clear, however, that he had to surmount a barrier to an easy
affirmance of the FCC's scuttling of the doctrine in Syracuse Peace Council. The problem was that the FCC had "slightly complicated the issue
by asserting that the policy and constitutional considerations are
inextricably intertwined." 6 7
Judge Williams insisted that the policy, public interest, and constitutional considerations in Syracuse Peace Council were separable; the abolition of the Fairness Doctrine could be predicated on the public interest
standard alone. 68 This position had a certain quixotic flavor because the
63. Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 669 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
64. Id.
65. Judge Wald's dissent, in part, addressed the point that the FCC in Syracuse Peace
Council had no authority to invalidate the first prong of the Fairness Doctrine. Judge Wald
described the first prong of the Fairness Doctrine as "requiring broadcasters to provide coverage of vitally important controversial issues of interest in the community served by the licensees." See 1985 Fairness Report, 102 F.C.C.2d at 146. Judge Wald believed that "this aspect of
the [FCC's] decision... [was] not supported by the record and was not adopted in compliance
with the Administrative Procedure Act." Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 669 (Wald,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Judge Williams said that during the entire proceeding no one had suggested that the
Fairness Doctrine was constitutionally compelled. Furthermore, since Judge Bork had spoken
in TRAC I, no claim that the Fairness Doctrine was mandated by statute could be made. 867
F.2d at 657.
67. Id. (citing Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C.Rcd. 5043, 5046 (1987)).
68. Id. at 659, 669.
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FCC had specifically based its Syracuse Peace Council decision on the
constitution.69

It would not have been unreasonable for the FCC to have been annoyed by Judge Williams' effort to deconstitutionalize the FCC's Syracuse Peace Council decision. The FCC had followed Judge Silberman's
direction from Meredith and had considered the constitutional issue.7 °
Now Judge Williams, for the other panel from the same court, seemed
determined to obfuscate that effort.
In a valiant effort to deconstitutionalize the FCC order abolishing
the Fairness Doctrine, the court of appeals panel emphasized the fact
that the FCC had incorporated its 1985 FairnessReport by reference in
its Syracuse Peace Council decision.7" The 1985 FairnessReport specifically declined to rule on the constitutional issue because it believed that

deciding the issue was a judicial rather than an agency prerogative.72 In
a separate concurrence in Syracuse Peace Council, Judge Starr said he
was unable to accept the panel decision's labored attempt to ignore the
constitutional rationale in the FCC decision to abolish the Fairness
Doctrine.73
Judge Starr, unlike Judge Williams, seemed prepared to rule that the
Fairness Doctrine was unconstitutional, but instead similarly tiptoed
69. Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, 5058 (1987) ("Accordingly, we reconsider our prior determinations in this matter and conclude that the Constitution bars us from enforcing the Fairness
Doctrine against station WTVH.").
70. While it is true that Judge Silberman gave the FCC the option on remand to dispose
of the matter on the public interest standard, it was clear that he preferred disposition on the
constitutional issue. Meredith Corp., 809 F.2d at 874.
71. Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 659. Judge Williams said that the 1985 Fairness
Report had two core findings upon which the FCC relied heavily in SyracusePeace Council: (1)
that the Fairness Doctrine chilled rather than encouraged expression; and (2) significant increases in the number of broadcast outlets removed the need for the Fairness Doctrine. Id. at
660. The response to this might be that findings such as a chilling effect and the scarcity
rationale relied on in the 1985 Fairness Report are, in fact, constitutional in nature.
72. To support his view that the Doctrine fails to serve the public interest, Judge Williams
relied on two conclusions of the FCC order in Syracuse Peace Council: (1) that the Fairness
Doctrine had a chilling effect; and (2) that it resulted in excessive government intrusion into
editorial autonomy. Id. at 659 (citing Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. at 5052). However, as Judge Starr pointed out in his concurrence, the FCC had referred to these matters in
an earlier portion of its order under a heading specifically entitled "Constitutional Considerations Under Red Lion." Id. at 675. This is just one of a number of examples in the order
evidencing a focus on the constitutional issue.
73. Judge Starr describes how the constitutional rug was pulled out from under the parties
in the case: "After elaborate briefing on the constitutional issue resolved by the Commission in
conformity with the Meredith remand, my colleagues have arrived at the view-urged by no
one in the case-that our analysis can properly proceed by, in effect, blue penciling the Commission's language purporting to base the agency's action on constitutional grounds." Id. at
673 (Starr, J. concurring). Judge Starr determined that the reason given by the majority for
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around the first amendment issue, albeit in a more. subtle fashion than
Judge Williams, stating: "I would hold only that the FCC's decision to
eliminate the Fairness Doctrine correctly interprets Red Lion and is
based, as the Court's opinion effectively demonstrates, on an adequate
factual record." 7 4
Although Judge Starr upheld the FCC order, he took great pains to
make it clear that there was no first amendment barrier to the enactment
of a new statute by Congress. Indeed, the whole thrust of his concuravoiding the constitutional issue is the salutary principle that courts must avoid constitutional
issues when non-constitutional grounds of decision are available. Id. at 674.
Two factors provide a more likely explanation for all the casuistry behind avoiding the
constitutional issue in the panel decision. One was a desire not to challenge the Red Lion
precedent; the other factor could have been a desire not to preclude efforts to reinstate the
Fairness Doctrine by statute. Congress would be undercut by a judicial holding that the Fairness Doctrine violated the first amendment since this would run counter to congressional efforts to revive the Fairness Doctrine-efforts which had been undertaken in the aftermath of
the FCC abolition order.
In Judge Starr's view, taking the unnecessary avoidance of constitutional issues principle
at face value made little sense in this context. For one thing, the avoidance principle makes
better sense when applied to statutes rather than agency-created policy. But even more fundamental was that there were no non-constitutional grounds in the FCC's Fairness Doctrine
abolition order upon which to base affirmance: "the record in this case simply will not, fairly
read, yield the conclusion that the agency has based the specific decision before us independently on non-constitutional grounds .... [I]n short, the constitutional justifications for the
Commission's actions must, alas, be considered." Id. at 674.
Judge Williams had observed in his opinion for the panel, "Happily the Commission's
opinion is not written in exclusively constitutional terms." Id. at 659. Judge Starr's concurrence effectively detonates this proposition.
74. Id. at 681. Judge Starr separated the factual bases of the FCC order from the constitutional principles used in the order and said that the court's evaluation of the FCC's factual
determinations should be looked at from an administrative law rather than a constitutional
perspective. This difference in perspective would affect the standard of review to be employed.
Judge Starr used an administrative law standard of review: the arbitrary and capricious standard. This standard gives great deference to the agency determination: "In view of the FCC's
obvious expertise, we would be unwise (and unfaithful to the APA) to disregard the Commission's ultimate conclusions of fact with respect to the Fairness Doctrine's chilling effect; its
interference with broadcasters' editorial discretion; and the explosive growth of media outlets."
Id. at 680.
Furthermore, Judge Starr suggested that if the panel in Syracuse Peace Council was rendering a constitutional law determination, then the doctrine of Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984), might be applicable. Bose calls for independent review by the appellate court of the actual malice finding in a New York Times v.
Sullivan-type libel case based on the theory that a finding with first amendment significance
which is based on factual determinations requires independent appellate review. The suggestion is that this Bose-based rationale could be extended to the Fairness Doctrine issue.
Judge Starr frees himself from the burden of this doctrine-after raising it-by qualifying
his restatement of the Bose doctrine: "Of course, as we have just seen, the line of cases culminating in Bose Corp. indicates that factual findings underlying the denial of a first amendment
challenge would be subject to independent review." Id. at 681 (emphasis in original). This
qualification cannot be found stated in haec verbis in either the Bose case or in a recent application of Bose. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S.Ct. 2678 (1989).
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rence is that Congress is free to enact a new statute. He emphasized that
the court was reviewing agency findings, not statutory findings. Therefore, "it would be anomalous if judicial approval of agency factual findings were awarded the Olympian force of a 'true' constitutional
75
decision."
Judge Starr, unlike Judge Williams, believed that the FCC's order
was predicated on constitutional considerations. But Judge Starr detached the factual bases of the FCC's order from the constitutional principles that they allegedly support with the same intensity that Judge
Williams exhibited in trying to separate the public interest basis of the
FCC order from its constitutional basis. Both exercises eliminated any
potential first amendment roadblock to the enactment of a new fairness
statute by Congress.
Although Judge Starr upheld the FCC's conclusion that the Fairness Doctrine is unconstitutional, his concurring opinion provides an
even more explicit basis for the enactment of a federal fairness statute
than does the panel decision:
In short, it is conceivable that detailed reconsideration by a future
FCC or carefully considered Congressional findings.., could persuade
a future court that, notwithstanding the FCC's contrary findings vindicated by today's decision, some in futuro version of the Fairness Doctrine could be implemented consistent with first amendment
strictures.7 6
Congress is thus encouraged to make specific findings to justify a
new Fairness Doctrine statute. Specific congressional findings will give a
federal fairness statute a better chance for surviving constitutional attack
in the courts. This is particularly true when the scope of judicial review
of the administrative action is the very limited arbitrary and capricious
standard.
II
The Congressional Reaction
Congressional reaction to the February 1988 court of appeals panel
decision in Syracuse Peace Council came on March 15, 1989, when the
Senate Subcommittee on Communications held a hearing on the proposed Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1989. In his opening comments
on the proposed Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1989, Senator Daniel K.
Inouye (D-Haw.) said:
Today's hearing is on the Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1989, a bill
to reinstate the Fairness Doctrine ....
This legislation is almost
identical to S. 742, which was passed by both the Senate and the House
75. Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 680.
76. Id. at 681 (citations omitted).
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last Congress but vetoed by the President. The purpose of this hearing
is to supplement the record with information on the effects of the elimination of the Fairness Doctrine by the FCC.77
The 1989 effort was not the first congressional response to the assault on the Fairness Doctrine. As an immediate consequence of the
1986 decision in Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC
("TRAC J1"),71 Congress asked the FCC in the 1986 Appropriations Act
to use funds appropriated to the FCC under the Act to "consider alternative means of administration and enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine
'79
and to report to the Congress by September 30, 1987."
Judge Bork held that the Fairness Doctrine was not codified by the
reference to it in the 1959 amendment to section 315 of the Communications Act.8 ° Therefore, the FCC was, in his view, under no statutory
duty to apply the Fairness Doctrine to teletext if in its understanding of
the public interest such an application was not warranted.
The FCC undertook a hearing to inquire into Fairness Doctrine alternatives.8 ! In the meantime, on April 21, 1987, the Senate passed S.
742 codifying the Fairness Doctrine and the House followed suit on June
3, 1987.82 Congress expressed its support of the Fairness Doctrine by
holding up passage of the entire $600 billion appropriations bill by including the Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987 in the appropriations
bill. Nonetheless, President Reagan vetoed the bill and Congress did not
try to override the veto. 3
In August 1987, the FCC abolished the Doctrine. In so doing, the
FCC ignored the specific congressional directive in the 1986 Appropriations Act to provide Congress with a report on alternatives to the Fairness Doctrine. 4
77. Fairness in BroadcastingAct of 1989: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989). See also supra note 13.
78. 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986) [hereinafter TRACI], petition for reh'gen banc denied,
Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
[hereinafter TRAC H]. These cases are further discussed in the next section.
79. 132 CONG. REC. H10619 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986), quoted in Meredith Corp. v. FCC,
809 F.2d 863, 873 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1987).
80. TRACI, 801 F.2d at 517-18.
81. Inquiry Concerning Alternatives to the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of
Broadcast Licensees, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 1532 (1987).
82. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
83. See Message to the Senate Returning S. 742 Without Approval, 23 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 715 (June 19, 1987).
84. The FCC was a bit red-faced by its actions in this regard and tried to explain itself in a
footnote in Syracuse Peace Council. The FCC said it was aware that former Chairman Fowler
had told members of Congress that the FCC would not decide Syracuse Peace Council before it
concluded the Fairness Doctrine alternatives report Congress had directed it to prepare:

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.

[Vol. 12:205

In 1989 Congress once again attempted to revive the Fairness Doctrine and to codify it in unmistakable terms. Such efforts occurred both
in the Senate 5 and in the House, where the House Energy and Commerce Committee added a Fairness Doctrine restoration provision to a
budget reconciliation bill.8 6 As in 1987, congressional emotions were
running high. Congressman John Dingell (D-Mich.), Chairman of the
House Energy and Commerce Committee, said that "no major communications legislation favorable to the broadcasting industry will move until fairness becomes law."8s7 The strategy behind including the Fairness
Doctrine restoration bill in the budget reconciliation bill was to "box in"
President Bush, thereby preventing a presidential veto like that issued
against the Fairness in Broadcasting Act in June 1987. Congress hoped
that the revenue-raising features in the budget reconciliation bill would
make President Bush reluctant to veto a fairness restoration bill. 8
In summary, the recent history of the Fairness Doctrine, from the
1985 FairnessReport89 when the FCC first made clear its wish to destroy
the Doctrine, to the present, demonstrates a slow but inexorable push by
the FCC to destroy the Doctrine. Some unanticipated developments in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
made this wish a possibility. Unexpected assistance from Judge Bork in
TRAC 190 and Judge Silberman in Meredith9 1 removed statutory and
doctrinal barriers to FCC abolition of the Doctrine.
[W]e have complied with that representation by today adopting and submitting the
report requested by Congress. We have concluded in that report that it would not
further the public interest to institute a rulemaking to consider the promulgation of
agency rules on fairness doctrine alternatives. As a consequence, we do not believe
that a suspension of this proceeding is warranted.... Furthermore, we note that the
only issue before us in this proceeding is the continued viability of the Fairness Doctrine as it is currently administered. Consideration of this issue does not necessitate
any additional evaluation of alternative policies.
Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, 5061-62 n.60 (1987) (emphasis in original).
85. See supra note 13.
86. See Editorial, BROADCASTING, July 24, 1989, at 114.
87. See FairnessEntangled in Budget Bill, BROADCASTING, July 17, 1989, at 27.
88. Broadcasting, in an editorial, criticized the broadcast industry for its decision not to
oppose recodification of the Fairness Doctrine, suggesting that this decision had been reached
to obtain a quid pro quo from Congress on the must-carry rules. Editorial, BROADCASTING,
July 10, 1989, at 74. See also Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (invalidating revised FCC must-carry rules on first amendment grounds). Under this
scenario, the FCC would reinstitute must-carry rules for broadcasters and broadcasters, in
turn, would agree not to oppose legislation to restore the Fairness Doctrine. Broadcastingprotested the anomaly that broadcasters were less opposed to the Fairness Doctrine than the FCC.
Editorial, BROADCASTING, July 10, 1989, at 74.
89. See 1985 Fairness Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 143.
90. See TRACI, 801 F.2d 501.
91. See Meredith Corp., 809 F.2d at 863.
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The deep-seated distaste for the Doctrine in the FCC and among
many of the newly-appointed members of the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit combined to at
least temporarily destroy the Doctrine, even though the Fairness Doctrine was still strongly and bitterly defended in Congress.
Fundamental issues are at stake in this battle over the Fairness Doctrine: Is there a fairness principle which inheres in the public interest
standard? Furthermore, is that principle a non-disposable component of
the public interest standard? We proceed to answer these questions next.
III

Fairness and the Public Interest Standard
The FCC abolition of the Fairness Doctrine was accomplished by
rejecting the idea that the Fairness Doctrine was codified in the 1959
amendment to section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934. However, this rejection is based on a public interest standard rationale; the
reference to fairness in section 315 is merely a congressional acknowledgement that the source for FCC creation of the Fairness Doctrine was
in the public interest standard of the Communications Act.9 2
92. In his history of the Fairness Doctrine, Steven J. Simmons shows that some students
of the Fairness Doctrine have long been of the opinion that the fairness principle is inherent in
the public interest standard: "Former FCC Commissioner Houser has written that 'almost
immediately' after the FCC was established 'it became apparent that inherent in the public
interest standard was a requirement that the successful applicant provide fairness in the treatment of matters selected for broadcast,' and Professor [Roscoe L.] Barrow maintains that there
was 'a substantial history of the Fairness Doctrine' even before 1941." S. SIMMONS, THE
FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA 31 (1978) (quoting Houser, The FairnessDoctrineAn HistoricalPerspective, 47 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 550, 553 (1972) and Barrow, The Equal
Opportunitiesand FairnessDoctrines in Broadcasting:Pillarsin the Forum of Democracy, 37 U.
CHI. L. REV. 447, 462 (1968)).
Others, of course, have disagreed. S. SIMMONS, supra, at 31.
I note that Professor Simmons cites me as having said that "the Fairness Doctrine received its first tentative formulation by the Commission" in 1941. Id. (quoting Barron, The
Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Doctrine: An Evaluation, 30 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1969)). This is, of course, a reference to the FCC's no-editorializing decision in
Mayflower Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941). However, the point is that even that recognition predated by eight years the FCC's formal announcement of a separate Fairness Doctrine
in the 1949 Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). Until

then, fairness was simply a principle or idea inherent in the public interest standard.
In further support of the idea that there is a bedrock fairness principle inherent in the
public interest standard, Professor Simmons reported that his research showed that the second
and most frequently enforced prong of the Fairness Doctrine-the obligation to provide bal-

anced presentation of controversial ideas of public importance-long preceded the formal
adoption of the Fairness Doctrine in 1949 by the FCC or its acknowledgement by Congress in
the amendment to § 315: "My own review of FCC and court materials leads me to conclude
that the affirmative part of the Fairness Doctrine, part one, did not surface until the 1940's.
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The most recent judicial consideration of the relationship of the
Fairness Doctrine to the public interest standard arose as a by-product of
the controversy about whether section 315 codified fairness. In the 1985
Fairness Report,93 the FCC made clear its view that the Fairness Doctrine was unnecessary and that it would prefer to abandon the Doctrine.
But the FCC said at that time that it felt it could not repudiate its longstanding view that the Fairness Doctrine had been codified by statute in
1959. However, the FCC's wish to do away with the Doctrine was aided
by an unexpected development.
Relief came from Telecommunications Research and Action Center
v. FCC ("TRAC I'). 9 The case presented the issue of whether a new
technology, teletext, should be regulated like more traditional types of
broadcasting. The FCC ruled that teletext was exempted from three
forms of broadcast regulation: reasonable access for federal political candidates under section 312(a)(7), equal opportunities under section 315,
and the Fairness Doctrine.
The FCC contended teletext should be governed by the Tornillo no
regulation/editorial autonomy standard" rather than the Red Lion scarcity rationale standard because teletext resembled and was competitive
with newspapers and magazines. In the print media arena, the FCC argued, there was no scarcity problem. Judge Bork, writing for the court
of appeals panel in TRA C I, displayed great sympathy for this argument
and expressed the hope that Tornillo would one day be pronounced applicable to both print and broadcast media. Nevertheless, Judge Bork
rejected the FCC's first amendment attack.9 6
Although the FCC lost the theoretical constitutional issue in TRAC
I, it basically won the war against the Fairness Doctrine. Judge Bork,
joined by Judge Scalia, announced in TRAC I that the FCC had exempted teletext from the Fairness Doctrine because "Congress never actually codified the Commission's Fairness Doctrine, and that the
Commission, therefore, had no obligation to extend its own policy to new
services like teletext." 97 Two public interest groups, the Telecommunications Research and Action Center (TRAC) and the Media Access ProHowever, part two, calling for program balance, does have roots in pre-1940 actions of the
FCC." See S. SIMMONS, supra, at 31.
93. See 1985 FairnessReport, 102 F.C.C.2d 143.
94. 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
95. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).

96. "Teletext, whatever its similarities to print media, uses broadcast frequencies, and
that, given Red Lion, would seem to be that." TRAC I, 801 F.2d at 509 (footnote omitted).

The question of whether the scarcity rationale can still justify the Fairness Doctrine in particular, or broadcast regulation in general, is discussed in Part IV.

97. Id. at 516-17.
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ject (MAP), disputed this contention on the ground that fairness was a
statutory obligation codified in the 1959 amendment to section 315 of the
Communications Act of 1934. But Judge Bork responded that the 1959
amendment merely "ratified the Commission's longstanding position that
the public interest standard authorizes the Fairness Doctrine."9
It is not the purpose of this Commentary to examine legislative history as to whether the 1959 amendment did or did not codify the Fairness Doctrine. Instead, the purpose is to explore the possible effects
acceptance of the TRA C I ratification theory will have on a fairness principle in the governance of the electronic media.
In TRAC I, Judge Bork said the FCC was within its authority to
decline to apply fairness to teletext: "Because the Fairness Doctrine derives from the mandate to serve the public interest, the Commission is
not bound to adhere to a view of the Fairness Doctrine that covers
teletext." 99 In this view, an agency can change its mind about a policy if
it believes that such a change serves the public interest. If an agency
makes such an aboutface, however, it must justify the departure from
prior policy. In TRAC I, the FCC had determined that applying the
Fairness Doctrine would impede the growth of that new technology and
the court ruled that this conclusion was rational.'0°
TRAC I exempted teletext from the Fairness Doctrine by characterizing the Doctrine as an administrative policy rather than a statutory
mandate under section 315. Could the FCC abandon the Fairness Doctrine altogether on the ground that the Doctrine was just an administrative policy? Judge Bork's conclusion in TRA C I, that fairness inhered in
the public interest standard, meant that the 1959 amendment to section
315 would not itself be a barrier to abandonment. But what about the
argument that the statutory public interest standard was itself a barrier
to abandonment of the Fairness Doctrine? The panel's decision in TRAC
I does not grapple with this issue. It is rejected by implication because
no limitation on the FCC's ability to change its conception of what the
public interest requires is suggested.
TRAC and MAP asked for a rehearing en banc of the panel's decision in TRAC I. The court denied the request with a per curiam order.' 0 ' Judge Abner Mikva, joined by.Judge Harry Edwards, dissented
from the denial of the rehearing en banc. In Judge Mikva's view, the
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 517.
Id.at 518.
Id.
TRAC H, 806 F.2d at 1117.
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majority's determination that the Fairness Doctrine was not a binding
statutory obligation under section 315(a) was flatly wrong. 102
Judge Bork, in a concurrence, supported the denial of a rehearing en
banc in TRAC II.103 For our purposes, the concurrence is significant
because this time Bork was not content merely to say that the Fairness
Doctrine was not codified in the 1959 amendment; instead he stated that
it was not codified in the public interest standard either. He thus addressed the contention which no judge on the court, much less the FCC,
had discussed-that fairness inhered in the public interest standard. Perhaps Judge Bork realized that the ultimate fairness codification issue centered around the public interest standard and that there was no point
banishing fairness from section 315 if it was still part of the public interest standard.
102. Id. at 1116. Judge Mikva believed that there were two reasons why this holding was
fundamentally wrong. First, he read the legislative history of the 1959 amendment as explicitly codifying the Fairness Doctrine. Second, he pointed to a number of prior decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which held that the 1959
amendment had codified the Fairness Doctrine.
Judge Mikva especially objected to Judge Bork's argument regarding codification: "In
responding to the petition for review in this case, the commission never argued that the Fairness Doctrine was not statutorily mandated." Id. at 1118 (emphasis in original). Judge Bork
in his panel decision for the court of appeals had simply reached out to decide the matter. For
the 1959 amendment the Commission is not simply
Judge Mikva, the law was clear: "[i]n
authorized to impose the fairness doctrine, it is compelled to do so." Id.
Judge Starr, joined by Judge Robinson and Judge Ginsburg, also dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc on the ground that Judge Mikva's dissenting statement merited careful consideration. Id.
103. Judge Bork said that the dissent "appears to think the Fairness Doctrine was enacted
for the first time in 1959." Id. at 1121. This, Judge Bork says, flies in the face of language in
many Supreme Court cases dealing with the FCC's public interest authority. Judge Mikva
really did not discuss the question of whether a fairness principle inhered in a statutory public
interest standard which was common to both the Radio Act of 1927 and its successor, the
Federal Communications Act of 1934.
Judge Mikva did not say, as Judge Bork claims he does, that Congress intended "to freeze
by statute the Fairness Doctrine in the form it had in 1959." Id. Judge Mikva was referring to
the Fairness Doctrine as a principle, not to particular ephemeral administrative applications of
the Doctrine. Indeed, this has been the general approach to the Doctrine. Until Syracuse
Peace Council, this was the approach of the FCC: the FCC was bound to follow the doctrine,
but no particular application of the doctrine was forever frozen.
The pre-Mark Fowler FCC, other than an unsuccessful attempt by Chairman Richard
Wiley to exempt radio from the Fairness Doctrine, was, in the main, too mindful of the Fairness Doctrine's public interest heritage and its own public interest enforcement obligations for
total abandonment of the fairness principle to be a plausible policy. In the 1974 Fairness
Report, for example, the FCC decided to repeal its post-1959 policy of applying the Fairness
Doctrine to product advertisements. See In re The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1
(1974). If Judge Bork's view of its § 315 codification position was correct, the FCC could not
have undertaken its post-1959 extension of the Fairness Doctrine to product commercials or
its repeal of that extension in 1974. What was intended to endure in the public interest standard and in § 315 was the fairness principle, not particular applications of that principle.
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Judge Bork in TRAC II focused particularly on language in Red
Lion where the Supreme Court construed the "disclaimer" that nothing
in the 1959 amendment to section 315 relieved broadcasters of their Fairness Doctrine obligation. Red Lion determined:
This language makes it very plain that Congress, in 1959, announced
that the phrase "public interest," which had been in the Act since
1927, imposed a duty on broadcasters to discuss both sides of controversial public issues. In other words, the amendment vindicated the
FCC's general view that the Fairness Doctrine inhered in the public
interest standard. Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction.°4 ,
Judge Bork noted that this language can be read in one of two ways:
either that (1) Congress enacted the Fairness Doctrine when it created
the public interest standard in the Radio Act of 1927; or (2) the public
interest concept found in the Radio Act of 1927 gave the Federal Radio
Commission, the predecessor of the FCC, the power to create the Fairness Doctrine. 105
It is interesting that even Judge Bork, hardly a Fairness Doctrine
champion, concedes the possibility that a fairness requirement, which is a
fundamental component of the public interest standard, may have been
ordained by Congress. Nevertheless, Judge Bork implies that the second
construction is the correct one. Under this construction, the FCC has
the authority under the public interest standard to create a Fairness Doctrine but is not required to do so. The result of Judge Bork's analysis is
that the Doctrine is not a statutory requirement under the public interest
standard.

06

By discussing the meaning of the public interest standard, Judge
Bork anticipated a fundamental question, which was raised by fairness
advocates in their petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court in the Syracuse Peace Council case.10 7 The question is this: Even if fairness is not
codified in the 1959 amendment to section 315, does the Doctrine still
have statutory force through the public interest standard, which was es104. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969) (footnote omitted).

105. TRAC II, 806 F.2d at 1119.
106. It should be noted that Judge Bork's view that fairness is not an enduring and essential component of the statutory public interest standard, espoused in his concurrence in support of the denial of a rehearing en banc in TRAC H, was not joined by any other member of
the court.
107. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir 1989), cert. denied, 58
U.S.L.W. 3427 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1990) (No. 89-312). In its petition, Syracuse Peace Council asserts as one of the questions presented for review: "Whether the public interest standard in the
Communications Act of 1934 requires that broadcast licensees act as public trustees to afford a
reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance."
Syracuse Peace Council, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, Supreme Court of the United States, No. 89-312, August
23, 1989.
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tablished, first, in the Radio Act of 1927 and, later, in the Federal Communications Act of 1934.
Judge Bork contends that Congress did not enact the Fairness Doctrine in the Radio Act of 1927. The Congress that wrote that Act, he
argues, knew how to be sufficiently specific to write an "equal opportunities" rule for political candidates directly into law, yet, "[i]t wrote nothing that embodied a broader Fairness Doctrine."' ' He also observes
that legislative proposals similar to the Fairness Doctrine were proposed
and rejected by the Congress prior to the enactment of the Radio Act of
1927. Thus, Judge Bork concludes: "The foregoing demonstrates that
the Fairness Doctrine was not enacted in 1927 and hence no such enactment could have been ratified in 1959. ' ' 109
How persuasive is Judge Bork's conclusion in TRAC II that fairness
was not enacted through the Radio Act of 1927? When he actually examines the legislative history of the Act, he does not focus on the reference to the "public interest" standard in the Radio Act of 1927, which is
emphasized in the Red Lion quote he construes. Instead he asks whether
a specific fairness concept was enacted in 1927. This is, of course, a rhetorical exercise because no one contends that it was.
Judge Bork does not specifically deal at this juncture with Justice
White's observation in Red Lion that "the phrase 'public interest,' which
had been in the Act since 1927, imposed a duty on broadcasters to discuss both sides of controversial public issues."1
By conceiving of the licensee as a public trustee, the FCC has enforced the public interest standard in broadcasting. By making broadcast
licensees public trustees obligated to enforce the public interest standard,
Congress created what Judge Skelly Wright once called the "unique hybrid of private sector ownership of the broadcast licensees tempered by
public service responsibilities.""' Judge Wright explained that licensees
were made public trustees obliged to enforce the public interest standard
108. TRACI1, 806 F.2d at 1121.
109. Id. Henry Geller, long-time fairness advocate and one of the lawyers who drafted the
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court in Syracuse Peace Council, disputes this analysis.
Telephone conversation with Henry Geller (Sept. 15, 1989). Geller views the legislative pro-

posals rejected at the time of the Radio Act of 1927 as "equal opportunities" for public issues
proposals. These proposals, because of their intrusiveness into broadcast journalism, were obviously unworkable and should be distinguished from a balanced presentation requirement for
conflicting issues of public importance. Furthermore, Geller observes that Judge Bork's analysis really proves too much. Under the Bork view, no Fairness Doctrine could even have been

developed by the FCC as administrative doctrine if Congress had specifically precluded recognition of such a requirement at the outset.
110. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 380.
111. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1427
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
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on a compensation theory: In return for "free and exclusive use of a limited part of the public domain," broadcasters were to be "burdened by
enforceable public obligations. '"" 2
In Syracuse Peace Council, Judge Williams addressed-and dismissed-the contention that fairness inhered in the public interest standard: "Thus the claim of some parties that the Communications Act
incorporates a public trustee concept that necessarily includes the Fairness Doctrine is in essence an effort to ask this panel to overturn TRAC
[I]"." But in fact, TRAC I simply did not rule on whether the public
trustee-public interest standard contained an indivisible fairness
component.
In his separate statement concurring in the denial of rehearing en
banc in TRAC II, Judge Bork tries to shut off this last supply of legal
oxygen for the Fairness Doctrine:
The distinction between a statement that a policy is mandated and a
statement that it is authorized is crucial, but it is a distinction the dissent systematically overlooks. There is every indication that Congress
ratified the Commission's authority to evolve the Fairness Doctrine
under the Act's public interest standard. But there is also every indication that Congress went no further. It did not legislate that, having
created the Fairness Doctrine, the 4Commission was required to keep it
and apply it as it stood in 1959.
This passage reflects the point that because the 1959 amendment did
not codify fairness, the FCC is free to decline to apply fairness to a new
broadcast technology. But this did not mean that the FCC could dispense with fairness altogether as it did in Syracuse Peace Council.
Is there an enduring fairness principle which inheres in the statutory
public interest standard which runs through the Federal Communication
Act of 1934? Or does the public interest standard have no constant content whatsoever?
I believe that the public interest standard of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 does have a core meaning that includes a fairness
obligation. In the short term, this may seem to be a matter of little consequence. The FCC is presently determined not to enforce a Fairness
Doctrine. No matter how powerful the argument may be that fairness
inheres in the public interest standard, the issue of the validity of that
argument may seem to be of academic interest only. However, the matter has immediate implications. It is impossible to have the system of
112. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 997, 1003
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
113. Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d 654, 657 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
114. See TRAC II, 806 F.2d at 1122.
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licensing that we have in the United States and take the position that the
broadcaster can operate in his private interest alone.
The whole theory of broadcast regulation and licensing operates on
the basis of a distinction that Warren Burger made in United Church of
Christ when he was still a judge on the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit:
A broadcaster seeks and is granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that
franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations. A newspaper can be operated
at the whim or caprice of its owners; a broadcast
1 15
station cannot.

The idea that the public interest standard in broadcasting is a completely
shifting standard, a standard which may be drained of any meaning at all
at the pleasure of the FCC is, of course, completely inconsistent with
Judge Burger's observations. This elastic conception of the public interest standard is implicit in Judge Bork's concurrence in TRA C H1.116
Suppose that the FCC were to say that in its conception of the public interest, broadcasters should be able to operate entirely with the same
latitude as the newspaper press? What issues would such a position
raise? It is clear that in recent years the FCC has moved closer and
closer to this position. Yet this position runs counter to the idea that a
public interest standard has at least a minimal definition.
A minimalist definition of the public interest standard has in fact
been recognized in recent years in absentminded moments even by Mark
Fowler's FCC. When the massive FCC deregulation of commercial radio was reviewed in United Church of Christ by an appeals court
panel," 7 Judge Wright, writing for the court, specifically insisted on a
minimum content for the public interest standard. Moreover, he did so
by relying on the FCC's similar understanding that the public interest
standard had a core meaning. In the course of its deregulation of radio,
the FCC "eliminated its quantitative processing guidelines for
nonentertainment programming.""' When various citizen groups challenged this abandonment, the court noted that in fact the FCC had not
abandoned all "regulation of nonentertainment programming in favor of
115. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003

(D.C. Cir. 1966).
116. "From the beginning, as the courts have repeatedly recognized [citations omitted], the
Commission has been accorded broad and supple power to evolve rules and regulations to
serve the 'public interest.' That flexibility is, and has been, the central feature of the Commission's authority." TRAC I 806 F.2d at 1121.
117. See Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
118. Id. at 1420.
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total reliance on marketplace forces. ' "9 The court noted that the FCC's
preference had been "to rely totally on the market and the decisions of
individual licensees to set the amounts and type of nonentertainment
programming." 120
Ultimately, the FCC decided against such complete deregulation
and "explicitly reaffirm[ed] a public interest obligation for all radio licensees." 12 1 Judge Wright then quoted the FCC's conclusion in the Radio
Deregulation proceeding that a "strict market approach" would not be
feasible and "could be construed as contrary to the Act which mandates
' 22
the licensing of individual stations."'
Judge Wright quotes the FCC further to note that "each licensee
has a bedrock obligation, historically rooted, to cover public issues." ' 23
Judge Wright's declaration in this connection was made in the context of
the radio deregulation proceeding. Some broadcasters challenged the
FCC's decision to continue to oblige broadcast licensees to provide "issue
responsive programming as part of the broadcaster's public interest obligation." Judge Wright rejected these objections: "However, over the
years Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Commission have left no
doubt that the regulatory scheme envisioned by the drafters of the Act
impose upon licensees some affirmative obligation to present informa' 24
tional programming."'
It is my contention that the FCC can no more entirely abandon a
policy of requiring broadcasters to make a balanced presentation of controversial issues of public importance than it could entirely abandon the
obligation to provide public issue programming in the Radio Deregulation proceeding. Justice White stated the matter simply in Red Lion
when he said of the 1959 amendment to section 315: "In other words,
the amendment vindicated the FCC's general view that the Fairness
Doctrine inhered in the public interest standard."' 2 5
Now it is true-and this is the heart of Judge Bork's separate concurrence in TRAC II-that Justice White also spoke in Red Lion of the
"natural conclusion" that "the public interest language" of the Federal
Communications Act "authorized the Commission to require licensees to
use their stations for discussion of public issues and that the FCC is free
to implement this requirement by reasonable rules and regulations
119. Id.at 1426.
120. Id.
121. Id.at 1427.
122. Report and Order on Radio Deregulation, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 1071 (1981), quoted in
Office of Communication of United Church of Christ, 707 F.2d at 1427.
123. Id.
124. United Church of Christ, 707 F.2d at 1429.
125. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969).
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This language could be taken to support Judge Bork's position:
the FCC is authorized to create a Fairness Doctrine under the public
interest standard, but that standard does not mandate retention of the
Doctrine. However, an interesting refutation of the Bork "authorization
is not requirement" view of whether fairness inheres in the public interest
is found in a piece of legislative history that is quoted by Justice White in
Red Lion. In 1930, Senator Dill declared that the Federal Radio Commission could issue regulations to require broadcast licensees "to afford
an opportunity for presentation of the other side on 'public questions.'"
Senator Dill. Then you are suggesting that the provision of the statute
that now requires a station to give equal opportunity to candidates for
office shall be applied to all public questions? Commissioner Robinson. Of course, I think in the legal concept the law requires it now. I
....

"126

do not see that there is any need to legislate about it. It will evolve one

of these days. Somebody will go into12court
and say, "I am entitled to
7
this opportunity," and he will get it.
This footnote in Justice White's opinion accompanies a reference to
the authority of the FCC to issue rules and regulations under the public
interest standard of the Act. 12' The point of this colloquy is that fairness
in the presentation of a public issues concept inheres in the public interest even without the issuance of regulations by the FCC.
Why do I recount this history of what previous courts, and the FCC
itself, thought the public interest standard in broadcast regulation to
mean? Certainly, it is not because I expect the FCC to issue a new fairness principle or doctrine any time in the near future. The purpose of
this discussion is simply to underscore that the public interest standard
has a certain minimal public issue obligation. This bedrock content of
the public interest standard is what differentiates broadcasting from the
print media.
If the public interest standard has this minimum content, then is
such a standard constitutional? If Congress restores the Fairness Doctrine in a new and explicit statute, we can expect a first amendment challenge to that statute. But the first amendment issue that would be raised
then is present now. A first amendment challenge to fairness is necessarily a challenge to the entire system of broadcast regulation. The basic
question is the same: Why can broadcasters be charged with specific informational duties to the communities to which they are licensed when
these same obligations cannot and could not be imposed on newspapers
in those same communities? In United Church of Christ, Judge Wright
126. Id. at 382 (emphasis added).
127. See Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce on S.6, 71st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1616 (1930), quoted in Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 379 n.7. (emphasis added).
128. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 303(r).
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said that the "clear intent" of the Federal Communications Act was that
the "award of a broadcasting license should be a 'public trust.' "129 He
relied here on Judge Burger's observation in the earlier United Church of
Christ case that "broadcasters are temporary permittees or-fiduciaries--of a great public resource." 30
Is the imposition of a public trustee obligation on broadcast licensees a violation of the first amendment? Broadcast licensees are bound
by a public interest standard, albeit minimal, which has constant and
enduring meaning. Is this public interest obligation a violation of the
first amendment? These are the questions which a first amendment attack on the Fairness Doctrine inevitably raise. They are not avoided by
saying that fairness was not codified in section 315. Neither are they
avoided by saying that the FCC repealed fairness on the basis of a nonconstitutional administrative policy determination in connection with the
FCC's evolving conception of the public interest standard.
It is the thesis of this paper that a certain component of the public
interest standard does not evolve but must remain constant. Fairness
opponents confront a Hobson's choice. They escape the argument that
fairness is codified in section 315 only by contending that section 315
merely ratifies a prior interpretation by the FCC of the public interest
standard. This in turn requires an inquiry into the bedrock meaning of
the public interest standard-a standard in which, as Justice White said,
fairness inhered. Does it violate the first amendment to make broadcast
licensees public trustees and to impose program service obligations on
them? It is this question to which I next proceed.
IV
Scarcity and The First Amendment Rationale for
Broadcast Regulation
This Commentary's special focus is on the struggle over the Fairness
Doctrine. But fairness does not present a different first amendment question than other policies in broadcast law. These are also specific explications of the public interest and public trusteeship concept. Trusteeship
and public interest are bound up not only with fairness but with concepts
like equal time. 3 1 All rely on Red Lion for their first amendment validity. The "equal time" principle in fact has been challenged. Thus, in
129. 707 F.2d at 1427.
130. Id. at 1427 n.38 (quoting Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
131. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 380-81. See also the text of the "equal time" rule, 47 U.S.C.
§ 315(a) (1989), set forth in note 3, supra.
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Branch v. FCC, 32 a television reporter wished to run for the local town
council; the station refused to allow him to continue working if he intended to pursue his candidacy. The reason? The station would have
been required under the "equal-time" provision of section 315 "to provide thirty-three hours-or about one and a half broadcast days of response time"' 33 to the reporter's opponents if he continued to work as a
television newscaster and run for election at the same time. The reporter,
William Branch, sought relief from both the FCC and the court of appeals, and both denied relief.
Branch contended that the "equal-time" or "equal opportunities"
rule violated the first amendment. Judge Bork rejected this argument.
He pointed out that when the Supreme Court declared the constitutional
validity of the Fairness Doctrine in Red Lion, it also specifically upheld
the equal time rule on the same basis: "[T]he [Red Lion] Court held that
the statutory 'equal opportunities' rule in section 315 and the Commission's own Fairness Doctrine rested on the same constitutional basis of
the government's power to regulate 'a scarce resource which the Government had denied others the right to use.' "134
Branch also argued that the equal opportunities rule was identical to
the right of reply to the newspaper press law struck down in Miami Herald PublishingCo. v. Tornillo.' 35 But Judge Bork held that the Court in
Red Lion differentiated broadcasting noting, "What makes the broadcast
medium unique, in the Court's view, is the scarcity of broadcast
frequencies."' 3 6
Judge Bork concluded that Red Lion compelled the court to reject
Branch's first amendment theory on this point. Furthermore, the court
of appeals could not retreat from the Red Lion holding. The Supreme
Court in FCC v. League of Women Voters-decided fifteen years after
Tornillo-had only recently reaffirmed Red Lion.'3 7 It is true that the
Court had asked for a "signal" as to whether technological change now
called for some revision of the system of broadcasting, and it was also
true that the FCC "may now" have provided such a signal in its 1985
Fairness Report. Nonetheless, the court of appeals was bound by Red
Lion: "unless the [Supreme] Court itself were to overrule Red Lion, we
1 38
remain bound by it.'
132.

824 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988).

133. Id.at 39.
134. Id. at 49 (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 391).

135.
136.
137.
138.

418 U.S. 241 (1974).
Branch, 824 F.2d at 49 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389-90).
Id.at 50.
Id.
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Judge Bork was not always so deferential to the scarcity rationale of
Red Lion as he was in Branch. A year before in TRAC I, he undertook a
fundamental critique of the scarcity rationale:
It is certainly true that broadcast frequencies are scarce but it is unclear why that fact justifies content regulation of broadcasting in a way
that would be intolerable if applied to the editorial process of the print
media. All economic goods are scarce, not least the newsprint, ink,
delivery trucks, computers, and other resources that go into the production and dissemination of print journalism .... Since scarcity is a
universal fact,
139 it can hardly explain regulation in one context and not
in another.
The flaw in this analysis is that it omits the role of government in
the allocation of frequencies in the broadcast system. Government by its
license allocation authority not only enables some to broadcast, it prevents others from broadcasting. Thus the power and value of the license
is enhanced.
It is true that Judge Bork mentions the role of government in his
opinion in connection with electronic interference. Government's role is
to define "usable frequencies" and to protect "those frequencies from encroachment." Bork does not recognize a different role for government in
broadcasting than the way in which government assists newspapers in
delivering their product when it regulates the traffic and allocates rights
of way. Neither does Bork recognize that cities do not have authority to
prevent newspapers from publishing altogether. They do not allocate
the use of the streets to one newspaper and deny it to others. Moreover,
even if they did, the newspaper would conceivably still be able to function; but a broadcaster without a license cannot function at all.
While there are economic barriers to entry into the newspaper business, in broadcasting, the would-be new entrant has two barriers to overcome. First, the specific cost of entering the broadcast business, be it
radio or television, acts as an economic barrier, and second, the would-be
entrant must face the licensing hurdle.
The unique licensing role of government in broadcasting endows
government with the status of ultimate gatekeeper. It is government, not
the market economy, that decides who shall broadcast and who shall not.
In TRA C I, after saying that the scarcity rationale cannot reconcile Red
Lion and Tornillo, Judge Bork expressed the hope that one day the
Supreme Court will revisit the distinction it has made between the systems of first amendment governance for the print and broadcast media"surely by pronouncing Tornillo applicable to both .... ."140
139. TRACI, 801 F.2d at 508.
140. Id. at 509.
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What would be the result of such a pronouncement? Broadcast media would be as free from government regulation as the newspaper press,
but unlike the newspaper press, the broadcast media would have the
assistance of a government licensing scheme to keep out competitors.
Tornillo holds out to the print media the promise of a laissez-faire regime. But in broadcasting, a government licensing scheme distributes a
public resource-the electromagnetic spectrum-to selected broadcasters. To promise a laissez-faire regime in such circumstances is to stand
the present system of broadcasting on its head. If the 1985 FairnessReport or the FCC's Fairness Doctrine abolition order in Syracuse Peace
Council had suggested that fairness should be abolished and that the
present system of licensing should be abandoned, then the desire to extend Tornillo to the broadcast media would at least be part of a coherent
theory. The objective would at least be clear-to separate government
from broadcasting. But that is not the agenda that is offered either in the
FCC's 1985 FairnessReport or in the order abolishing the Fairness Doctrine. Instead, the public service obligation of broadcasters was compared with the lack of such obligation on the part of the print media.
The first amendment is to be used as a lever to remove the obligations
now imposed on broadcasters. The remarkable feature of this position is
that it is undertaken without any acknowledgment of, or apparent desire
to change, the present status of broadcast licensees as-in Warren Bur' 141
ger's words-"permittees" or "fiduciaries."
As we have seen from reading Branch and TRAC I together, Judge
Bork believes the scarcity rational cannot justify the present system of
applying a different standard of first amendment governance to the
broadcast media than to the print media:
One might attempt to resolve the tension between Tornillo and Red
Lion on the ground that, while scarcity characterizes both print and
broadcast media, the latter must be operating under conditions of
greater "scarcity" than the former. This, however, is unpersuasive.
There is nothing uniquely scarce about the broadcast spectrum.
Broadcast frequencies are much less scarce now than when the scarcity
rationale first arose in NationalBroadcastingCompany v. United States
(citation omitted). . . . Indeed, many markets have a far greater
number of broadcasting stations than newspapers142
In this passage, reference is made to the Supreme Court case that is
the foundation stone of broadcast regulation, National BroadcastingCo.
141. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC., 425 F.2d 543, 548
(D.C. Cir. 1969); cf Dyk, Full FirstAmendment Freedom for Broadcasters: The Industry as
Eliza On the Ice and Congress as Overseer, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 299 (1988), arguing that broadcasters should be granted permanent licensing and that there should be no content regulation.
142. TRAC , 801 F.2d at 508-09 n.4.

1989]

FAIRNESS DOCTRINE

v. United States.14 3 However, there is nothing in Justice Frankfurter's
opinion in NBC to suggest that an increase in the number of licensed
broadcast outlets would fatally undermine the scarcity rationale as a basis for broadcast regulation. In upholding the FCC's chain broadcast
regulations, Justice Frankfurter dealt with the contention of the networks that limiting the right of a network affiliate to sign up for the
network programming for the entire broadcast day violates the first
amendment. Justice Frankfurter rejected this argument as follows:
"Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the limited
facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is
not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why,
unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental
regulation."' 44
What Justice Frankfurter is talking about here is not that there are
not "enough" broadcast outlets-whatever "enough" would be-but
rather about the finite quality of the spectrum, and the various demands
of government and society that it must satisfy. Every American cannot
broadcast. One cannot have a workable system of broadcasting and give
everyone a portion of the spectrum. Justice Frankfurter expanded on
this at an earlier point in his opinion in NBC: "The plight into which
radio fell prior to 1927 was attributable to certain basic facts about radio
as a means of communication-its facilities are limited; they are not
available to all who wish to use them; the radio spectrum simply is not
large enough to accommodate everybody."' 45 Justice White made a similar point nearly a quarter of a century later when he charted the process
by which the broadcast licensee became a public trustee in Red Lion:
"Rather than confer frequency monopolies on a relatively small number
of licensees in a Nation of 200,000,000, the Government could surely
have decreed that each frequency should be shared among all or some of
those who wish to use it, each being assigned a portion of the broadcast
146
day or the broadcast week."
In contrast, Judge Bork in TRAC I emphasized the significance of
the rise in the number of broadcast outlets in the years since Red Lion.147
This analysis is not accepted by all the players in the recent fairness litigation. Judge Starr in his concurring opinion in Syracuse Peace Council
makes a distinction between allocational scarcity and numerical scar143. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
144. Id. at 226.

145. Id. at 213.
146. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
147. TRACI, 801 F.2d at 508-09.
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city. 118 As he sees it, fairness proponents believe the Doctrine to be valid
under the first amendment "so long as allocationalscarcity exists."' 4 9 On
the other hand, he says, the FCC and other fairness opponents contend
that the Doctrine is "depend[ent] on numericalscarcity in the sense that,
without government intervention, the public is not provided with access
to diverse viewpoints."' 5
Judge Starr says that he believes the FCC's position is more sound.
Allocational scarcity can justify broadcast regulation generally. But
"regulatory schemes" like the Fairness Doctrine which intrude "into first
amendment territory" can only be justified by numerical scarcity. 5 '
This distinction is attractive to the broadcast industry. They can rely on
allocational scarcity to protect the licensing system and their licenses
since the incumbent is virtually always renewed. But they can be freed
from regulatory obligations which displease them on the ground that
only a numerical scarcity rationale can justify regulatory doctrines like
fairness. Today, they argue-unlike the situation in Red Lion-numerical scarcity does not exist.
This distinction between allocational and numerical scarcity
originated with Judge Starr and not Justice White. Not a suggestion of it
can be found in Red Lion. Furthermore, allocational scarcity-in the
sense that every American cannot practically be given a piece of the spectrum-was, as has already been shown, an integral part of the rationale
of Red Lion. Indeed, an individualist perspective of the first amendment
was at the heart of Red Lion. This is what Justice White meant when he
said the first amendment right of the broadcaster is subordinate to the
first amendment rights of the viewer and listener. The allocational-numerical scarcity distinction allows broadcasters to have it both ways.
They keep their licenses and they are obliged to do nothing for them.
The allocation-numerical scarcity distinction obscures the role of the
broadcaster as public trustee.
Judge Starr said that "spectrum scarcity, without more" did not justify "regulatory schemes which intruded into first amendment territory. ' ' I 52 What more was necessary? He answered this question by
saying that the Supreme Court has upheld broadcast regulation when the
"regulation furthered substantial first amendment interests .... .53 At
this point Judge Starr gets into very deep water and, I believe, seriously
148. 867 F.2d 654, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3427 (U.S. Jan. 9,
1990) (No. 89-312).
149. 867 F.2d at 682.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 683.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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misreads Red Lion. His purpose in this discussion is to attack the reliance of Fairness Doctrine advocates on "the concept of allocational scarcity." His critique runs as follows: "[T]he central concern of Red Lion is
that the Fairness Doctrine 'preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas.' [citation omitted] Indeed, a reading of Red Lion yields no evidence that the mere presence of excluded broadcastersis to be regarded
as dispositive of the public's need for programming of a particular
type."

54

The significance of the allocational scarcity issue in Red Lion is not
directed toward those within the excluded media, but it is directed to the
excluded public. It never occurs to Judge Starr that an approach to first

amendment interpretation might have as its focus the public rather than
the media. Some later cases, such as FCC v. National Citizens Committee
for Broadcasting,155 Columbia BroadcastingSystems v. FCC,5 6 and Herbert v. Lando, 5' 7 emphasize the public or non-media dimension of first
amendment protection. An exclusively media-oriented approach to the
first amendment can, of course, also be easily found in post-Red Lion
Supreme Court case law. The paradigm is certainly Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo15 1 but other examples can be found. Illustrative
are Chief Justice Burger's observations in Richmond Newspapers'5 9 that
the media act as the surrogate for the public and in Nebraska Press' 0
that the media have a fiduciary duty to the public.
The key to understanding these observations, of course, is that the
surrogate relationship or fiduciary relationship spoken of is intended to
be non-enforceable in character. This is appropriate enough because Nebraska Press and Richmond Newspapers are print media cases. Red Lion
is a broadcast media case. It does make an issue out of allocational scarcity in broadcasting and it does impose on broadcasters a fiduciary trusteeship which, unlike the situation with the print media, is intended to be
enforceable.
In the scheme of things contemplated by the Red Lion Court, the
broadcaster is the trustee for the public and the FCC holds the broadcaster accountable for his fiduciary obligation. Judge Starr takes the
Court's language on that point and turns it on its head. Thus, he observes that the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine is "closely related to the incapacity of the communications marketplace to give
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. (emphasis in original).
436 U.S. 775 (1978).
453 U.S. 367 (1981).
441 U.S. 153 (1979).
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980).
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560 (1976).
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expression to diverse voices." 1 6 ' Then he cites the much quoted line in
Red Lion that it is the public's right to receive "suitable access to social,
political, esthetic, moral and other ideas .. 1..,,'62
This line of analysis
argues that, because allocational scarcity at the time of Red Lion meant
that some would-be broadcasters were excluded, a Fairness Doctrine was
justified at that time because it led to the promotion of diverse voices.
Nevertheless, the argument proceeds, if in the years since Red Lion the
communications arena has provided additional voices to the point that
there need no longer be any concern about the need for diverse voices,
then the Fairness Doctrine cannot be justified under the first amendment.
In other words, in a first amendment context, a diminution in numerical
scarcity will cancel out the first amendment significance of allocational
scarcity.
If the number of broadcasters has increased since Red Lion to the
point that some optimal diversity of ideas quotient now characterizes the
opinion process, is the proxy or trusteeship function of broadcast licenses
no longer necessary? Can there be licensing without trusteeship? Is it
constitutional to allocate a portion of the spectrum to a licensee with no
obligation to air their own views? There are no answers to these questions in Syracuse Peace Council by either the FCC or the court. The
implication is, however, that the FCC has concluded that the information process is sufficiently rich in outlets to allow the privatization of
broadcasting. The FCC, Judge Starr implies, may so determine the issue
until Congress says otherwise.
The FCC may repeal the Fairness Doctrine on the grounds that
there are now far more electronic voices than was the case in Red Lion.
But Congress may contradict this judgment by saying that even though
there are now more voices, there is still not enough diversity. In my
view, the FCC and the courts had no authority to abolish the Fairness
Doctrine under existing law because of the public interest standard. The
Syracuse Peace Council decision goes to considerable lengths to avoid the
question whether a new fairness statute would violate the first amendment.1 63 The decision and the FCC opinions which undergird it suggest
that there may be very difficult first amendment questions raised by a
statute mandating fairness. But the basic first amendment issue is present now.
Allocational scarcity is a reality with first amendment significance
even if numerical scarcity is no longer a problem. It does not follow that
because there are more outlets, allocational scarcity is no longer a prob161. Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d 654, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).
162. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
163. Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d 654.
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lem. The assumption here is that adding voices solves the right of the
public to have access to ideas. This public right is not entirely satisfied
by enlarging media representation. What troubled Justice White, writing
for a unanimous Court in Red Lion, was that each member of the public
cannot each have a piece of the spectrum. Indeed we have a trusteeship
concept, a public interest concept, and a fairness concept because, as Justice White said, each of 200,000,000 Americans is not himself or herself
given a piece of the spectrum as Congress could have chosen to do. The
public were not directly given, as they could have been, the resource, the
electromagnetic spectrum, which belongs to them. Broadcasters are licensed for a reason-to serve as "proxies" or "trustees" for the public
they are licensed to serve.
V
The Fairness Struggle and Its First Amendment
Significance: Some Conclusions
Suppose Congress enacts a new fairness statute, its first amendment
validity is challenged, and the case which raised the issue reaches the
Rehnquist Court? We can assume that the case would be the first
amendment case of the century. But no new issues would be raised.
Tension and conflict already exists in the Supreme Court's first amendment case law. This case law sometimes puts the public first in a case of
conflict with the media, and sometimes does not. Red Lion espouses the
position that particularly in broadcasting, government can legislate with
respect to the opinion process because government is legislating concerning a resource which belongs to the public rather than private parties.
Red Lion casts the first amendment in an uncommon role. The first
amendment plays a positive role in the opinion process in broadcasting
rather than the negative role it typically plays in the print media-keeping government out. Furthermore, in the law of broadcasting the individual is seen-at least in the case of ultimate first amendment conflictas more important than the media or communicator.
Those who participated in the recent destruction of the Fairness
Doctrine were well aware that the fairness issue has within it the ingredients for a new streamlined, monolithic view of the first amendment.
Stripped of its present tensions, the first amendment will be seen simply
as the guarantor of the media position when conflicts occur in the opinion process. Former Commissioner Nicholas Johnson has written: "The
fight over the Fairness Doctrine is about nothing less than possession of
the first amendment: Who gets to have, and express opinions in
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America." 1" This is an accurate statement of what is at stake. My own
view, as a supporter of the Fairness Doctrine, is not that every broadcast
quarrel between the broadcaster and the public should be resolved in
favor of the individual or the public. Rather, no sector of society should
be given ultimate and exclusive title to, or possession of, the first
amendment.
Until recently, our law has been characterized by a helpful dialectic,
particularly in the broadcast field. In 1969, Red Lion was a victory for
the public and for the individual who believed that a broadcaster had
been unfair. But Columbia BroadcastingSystems v. DemocraticNational
Committee1 65 in 1973 was a victory for the broadcast networks against
political parties and citizen groups who sought access to them. In this
case, the Court decided in favor of the broadcaster-no statute required
the access the public interest groups sought. The Court justified its
probroadcaster result by relying on the Fairness Doctrine and the public
interest standard. These results led to the formation of subtle and conflicting currents in first amendment interpretation. Competing and contradictory consequences flow from a first amendment theory rich and
generous enough to accord both the citizen and the media the right of
free expression. This whole approach is predicated on the assumption
that no one set of participants in the life of ideas should be anointed with
a permanent first amendment halo. The issue in the present fairness controversy is altogether different. There is an implicit agenda in the mosaic
of cases and administrative decisions that resulted in the abolition of the
Fairness Doctrine. The agenda includes a number of objectives. First,
the first amendment requires the privatization of broadcasting. Second,
the broadcast media and the print media should be subject to identical
first amendment standards. Third, the impact on the media, as the media perceive that impact, should be the sole measure of whether first
amendment interests are upheld or infringed. Fourth, the first amendment should not be used to effectuate public rights in the opinion process. These objectives have nearly been accomplished in our current first
amendment law.
What is at stake in the Fairness Doctrine controversy-and what
will certainly come to the fore if the Fairness Doctrine is revived through
a new statute-is nothing less than the future of an instrumental approach to first amendment problems. Judge Starr acknowledged this in
Syracuse Peace Council when he referred to the Supreme Court case law
that identified the instrumental role of Fairness Doctrine in particular,
164. Johnson, 'With Due Regardfor the Opinion of Others: The FairnessDoctrineFight Is
Over Nothing Less than Possession of the First Amendment, 8 CAL. LAW., Aug. 1988, at 53.
165. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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and broadcast regulation in general in effectuating first amendment
goals.' 6 6 These cases still constitute the first amendment perspective in
broadcast regulation. Their future-painful as it may be to acknowledge
for those, like myself, who share their inclusive and populist conception
of the first amendment-is in doubt.
A new Fairness Doctrine statute could be invalidated on a number
of grounds. These include the obsolescence of the scarcity rationale, the
contention that the Fairness Doctrine has a chilling effect, or the idea
that the broadcast media should be governed by the same first amendment norms that govern the print media. These arguments figured
largely in the intricate litigation preceding the 1987 abolition of the Fairness Doctrine. I believe that the recent judicial and agency decisions,
which rely on these arguments, are not dispositive of the validity of the
fairness issue.
The scarcity rationale itself, as we have seen, turns out to be a twoedged sword. There is a weak link in any first amendment argument
which uses the absence of scarcity against the continuation of old, or the
development of new, broadcast regulatory policies. The weakness is that
repeal is asked for all regulatory policies except the ultimate one-the
licensing scheme.
Judge Staff attempted to escape this problem by arguing that acceptance of the scarcity rationale in Red Lion was contingent upon its
relationship to other policies such as the furtherance of first amendment
values, and the effectuation of the public's right of access to ideas. 167 Just
so, licensing exists precisely to accomplish these objectives. However,
the argument that the broadcast media and the print media should be
subject to the same first amendment regime can only be seriously undertaken if one is willing to privatize broadcasting and dispense with
licensing.
The Syracuse Peace Council decision makes reference to the ability
of Congress to make findings, and implies that congressional findings on
matters like chilling effect and scarcity will carry great weight.' 6 8 The
1989 Fairness in Broadcasting Act is replete with findings on the continuation of scarcity in the broadcast media and on the need for additional
diverse views in broadcasting. Yet, the extent to which congressional
findings on the factual predicates supporting policies in the first amendment area will receive deference by the Supreme Court is an issue that is
not altogether clear.
166. 867 F.2d at 677.
167. Id. at 683.
168. Id. at 654. See generally Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973).
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In FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,
for example, the cross-ownership rules were upheld by a unanimous Supreme
Court against a first amendment challenge. It was said of the rules under
attack in that case that they were justified, inter alia, on the ground that
they rested on first amendment-based policies.' 7 ° In NCCB, the policies
were used to validate FCC rules rather than a specific statutory mandate.
One could argue that an even stronger case exists for upholding a new
congressionally mandated Fairness Doctrine on such a basis. Congressional findings surely merit more judicial deference than agency ones.
It will be argued, however, that where a statute involves a regulatory
policy like the Fairness Doctrine, interference with broadcast content
and editorial judgment is implicated. This argument should be considered in the light of another aspect of the fairness problem. The editorial
autonomy of broadcast journalism obviously has a claim to first amendment protection but so does the party whose point of view is not allowed
expression. The party challenging the broadcaster under the Fairness
Doctrine is not the state but the public. The state provides the mechanism for debate. The question of the weight to be accorded congressional
findings in a new fairness statute must be approached not as if the constitutional issue presents a contest between the broadcaster and the state;
rather, the issue must be viewed as it truly is, a contest in terms between
the broadcaster and a member of the public. The issue-and this must
always be underscored-is one of first amendment rights in conflict.
The licensee, a public trustee, has first amendment rights but so do
members of the licensee's audience. Individual rights in broadcasting
precipitated Red Lion itself. The public trustee concept and the public
interest standard are predicated on the assumption that no one set of
participants in the opinion process should always prevail.
In summary, the public trustee-public interest structure of American broadcasting is fatally undermined by the total abolition of any fairness requirement in broadcasting. It cannot be acceptable that the most
important public resource, the airwaves-the primary forum for the nation's exchange of ideas-can be wholly privatized. So parochial a view
of the first amendment and of broadcasting should not be allowed to
prevail.

169. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
170. Id. at 798-99.

